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Maximizing Conservation and In-Kind Cost Share:  
Applying Goal Programming to Forest Protection  
 
Conservation continues to be a major policy objective in the United States and internationally.  
Examples of programs which have been implemented to achieve conservation objectives include 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) which has yearly 
enrollment of over 30 million acres (USDA 2009).  U.S. states and county programs have spent 
over $2 billion protecting over 1 million acres with permanent agricultural conservation 
easements in a recent 25-year period (American Farmland Trust 2010), while the entire set of 
open-space referenda authorized $31 billion between 1996 and 2009 alone (Trust for Public 
Lands, 2009).  As of 2005, 37 million acres had been protected by the 1,667 private land trusts in 
the United States (Aldrich and Wyerman 2006).  The most recent U.S. Farm Bill (2008-2012) 
allocates $11.7 billion for conservation
i including expenditures of up to $1.8 for the CRP in 2010 
(USDA 2009), while in the European Union an anticipated €35.4 billion will be spent on “agri-
environmental” programs between 2007 and 2013.
ii Perhaps the largest conservation program in 
the world is China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program with an estimated budget of $48 billion 
(Xu et al. 2010).   
Frequently, these conservation programs involve some type of in-kind cost share or 
matching funds component where one program seeks to leverage additional resources from 
partner agencies, organizations, or individuals to achieve their conservation objectives (Kotani, 
Messer, and Schulze, 2010).  While researchers have long advocated for the inclusion of costs as 
part of the selection process through either benefit-cost targeting (Babcock et al. 1997) or integer 
programming (Underhill 1994), the literature has not addressed issues around how to best 
incorporate in-kind cost sharing from partners into the selection process.  While in-kind cost  
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share contributions are implicitly accounted for through the lower project costs facing the 
funding organization, this fails to take full advantage of the additional information potentially 
provided by the size of the in-kind cost share, such as the level of commitment of the partner 
organization and the political benefits of being able to use program funds to leverage resources 
from other organizations, agencies, and individuals.  This research addresses this potential 
concern by developing a two- and three-dimensional Goal Programming (GP) model that seeks 
to optimize both conservation outcomes and partner in-kind cost share contributions.  This model 
is applied to the 2008 applicants to the U.S. Forest Service’s Forest Legacy Program (FLP), the 
largest single program dedicated to preserving productive forest land in the United States.   
Results from the models show that GP offers results that are superior to the program’s current 
selection mechanism and can also yield cost-effective outcomes that may be more practical than 
traditional optimization approaches so that they could be more attractive for adoption for 
program managers.  
 
2. Literature  Review 
In spite of the substantial amount of money spent on land conservation programs, most 
conservation programs are typically faced with more potential projects than they are able to fund. 
A vast body of economic literature has grown up around conservation programs aiming to 
evaluate the efficiency achieved with the vast public and private resources invested into these 
programs. It has been widely acknowledged that the selection methods typically employed by 
land conservation programs are sub-optimal. As part of the selection process, programs 
frequently assign parcels with scores based on a variety of scoring systems, such as ratings from  
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expert panels, standardized scoring system such as the Natural Resource Conservation Service’s 
Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA) score for agricultural land, or the Environmental 
Benefit Index (EBI) originally designed for CRP.  These parcel-specific scores are then used by 
the selection mechanism, typically a Benefit Targeting (BT) algorithm, which is essentially a 
greedy algorithm where projects are funded from highest to lowest benefit score until funds are 
exhausted.  This approach has been subject to substantial criticism as being very inefficient, and 
it has been repeatedly proposed that adopting alternative mathematical optimization methods 
would lead to superior outcomes (for example, Babcock, et al., 1997; Polasky, et al., 2001; Wu, 
et al., 2000). 
One alternative to BT is Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). With CEA projects are 
ranked in terms of environmental benefits achieved per dollars spent on the project. These cost 
effectiveness ratios are then ranked and projects selected by highest ratio until funds are 
exhausted. CEA performs quite well as compared to BT and are easy to implement, but can still 
achieve suboptimal results under certain circumstances (Messer 2006). Additionally, CEA does 
not allow for additional constraints to be easily placed on the problem. 
A second alternative is Binary Linear Programming (BLP), also referred to as Binary 
Integer Programming. BLP is a variation on linear programming problems where there is a 
binary (0/1) variable representing the decision to fund a project.  BLP maximizes the benefit 
score of each project, which is multiplied by the binary variable representing the funding 
decision, subject to the project costs times the funding decision variables and any other 
constraints that are pertinent. Through the use of the branch-and-bound algorithm, BLP considers 
every possible combination of projects and selects the best combination.  BLP typically performs 
somewhat better that CEA.  
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In spite of the promise of substantial increase in environmental benefits offered by both 
CEA and BLP land conservation programs have been very hesitant to adopt either in their 
practices. To our knowledge, the only organization that has used either of these techniques is the 
Baltimore County’s Division of Environmental Protection and Resource Management (DEPRM), 
which has used CEA for its agricultural protection program since 2007.  In the first three years of 
use, DEPRM protected an additional 680 acres worth $5.4 million relative to what they would 
have done with their previous BT given the same budget amounts (Kaiser and Messer, 2010).  
Researchers have speculated about the lack of adoption of cost-effective and optimization 
techniques (i.e. Prendergast, et al., 1999; Pressey and Cowling, 2002). For example, Prendergast, 
et al (1999), as the result of an informal interviewing process with a wide sample of ecologists 
and land managers, identified three main barriers for adoption: lack of knowledge, lack of 
resources, and real or perceived shortcomings in the methods.  These authors conclude that 
ultimately for conservation optimization to be widely adopted more work needs to be done to 
cater research to the needs of real life conservation practice.  A recent survey of Maryland 
county level conservation program administrators suggested that managers not only lacked 
knowledge of BLP and CEA, but managers also reported not considering cost to be a major 
priority in the selection process and lacking incentives that would lead them to adopt it with their 
program (Chen 2010).  
Another possible explanation for this lack of adoption is that managers need to be able to 
consider numerous political and strategic objectives in their decision making process. Their 
duties include not merely maximizing benefit scores, but also defending the “value” achieved 
from donor, funding agency, or tax payers’ money, ensuring that applicants get a fair deal from a 
transparent decision mechanism, and distributing funds in a manner perceived as equitable.  BLP  
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is unable to clearly address many of these duties. These can be thought of as secondary or 
operational objectives that do not immediately impact the primary goal of protecting high quality 
land but still may be important factors in the decision making process. One way to incorporated 
these into the problem is as constraints, but this offers little ability to consider sensitivity or 
alternatives to the single solution provided. This is the basis of the appraoch used in Önal et al. 
(1998) which considers both environmental and equity concerns for watershed management 
using a mathematical programming model. This model maximizes total profit across a watershed 
with a chance constraint on chemical runoff levels to take into account the stochastic nature of 
rainfall, and a constraint on the equity of program impact as measured by an index measurement 
of deviation from a uniform loss sharing level. These constraints are varied to examine the 
tradeoff between income, pollution, and equity losses.  
A second option is to format the problem as a GP problem with these secondary objectives 
included as weighted goals. There have been several applications of GP in this field, including 
balancing economic and biological objectives over short term and long term time frames in 
fishery management (Drynan and Sandiford, 1985; Mardle and Pascoe, 2000; Mardle et al., 
2002) optimizing environmental, social, and economic goals in energy production (Silva and 
Nakata, 2009); and the management of public water resources (Neely et al., 1977; Ballestero et 
al., 2002). Önal (1997) considers an approach similar to GP in forest management. A model is 
employed which, instead of minimizing deviations froma goal as is done in GP, uses constrained 
deviations from a goal to maximize discounted future harvest value while maintaining  a 
minimum value of a species diversity index. To our knowledge GP has not proposed in the 
planning of land conservation decisions.   
6 
 
  In-kind cost sharing is an example of a secondary objective.  According to Kathryn 
Conant, National Forest Legacy Program Manager, the US Forest Service is interested in 
approaches that could both maximize forest benefits and get the most from leveraged partner cost 
sharing funds (Conant 2008).  The use of cost sharing (or matching funds) is very common in 
conservation and other publically-funded programs. While the way in which such requirements  
implemented can vary, typical approaches include requirements that the participating 
organization cover some percentage of the total cost of the projects themselves (for instance, the 
USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program (USDA 2010)), or a system where the amount of in-
kind cost sharing offered weights the ranking for amount of funds awarded or priority to receive 
funds (such as is the case with some counties that apply for funds for water quality enhancements 
from the Pennsylvania’s Dirt and Gravel Road Program (Bradford County Conservation District, 
2006)). Programs that require some sort of cost sharing include the USDA’s Conservation 
Reserve and Forest Legacy Programs, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s National Wetlands 
Conservation Grant Program, and numerous other federal, state, and private conservation 
funding programs.  
Several justifications are typically offered for requiring some sort of in-kind costs share 
in the selection mechanism for conservation programs.  A primary justification is that by asking 
applicants to commit to pay for some of the costs themselves, this ensures that applicants are 
committed to the project and consider it worth the effort to conserve. In other words, the 
applicant is willing to “put their money where their mouth is” for the project.  Another 
justification is that cost sharing helps extend the reach of the conservation program as it can be 
considered a type of discount on the total project price. From the point of view of the funding  
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agency, this could mean that there would be more money available to fund additional projects 
and also help increase the number of projects funded with the program’s funds.  
  In the literature, in-kind cost sharing can be considered a type of matching grant program 
where the granting agency agrees to pay some portion of costs up to a percentage of the total 
project costs. Theoretically, matching grants are seen as a mechanism to correct for externalities 
and spillovers in federalized agency structures. Oates (1999) points out that the local benefits 
from a project under consideration may not justify funding the project for the local agency. 
However, the spillover benefits to other areas make it attractive to society as a whole. The 
matching grant offered by an outside body would represent a sort of Pigouvian subsidy to pay the 
local agency for the external benefits obtained in other jurisdictions.  Bucovetsky et al., (1998) 
offers an informational argument for matching grants similar to the “money where mouth is” 
justification. Ideally, a government should distribute funds to the regions which value public 
services the most.  The matching grant severs as a mechanism to reveal the private value of 
funding to the applicants.  
Current evidence on the effect of matching grants and cost sharing has not offered strong 
results. Baker et al. (1998) found that instituting a matching grant system in the Canada 
Assistance Plan lowered expenditures growth by 8 to 9 percentage points as provinces became 
responsible for a portion of program costs. Using simulations, Borge and Rattsø (2008) found 
that compared to block grants matching grants decrease expense, but lead to unstable service 
provision over time.  Chernick (1995) found that the conversion from matching grants to fixed 
block grants by U.S. federal welfare funding programs had substantial variation across states, but 
generally led to a reduction in benefits. For an in depth discussion of matching grants and their 
implementation see Boadway and Shah (2007).  
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  In the following section we develop a GP model which incorporates in-kind cost share as 
a secondary objective. Following that we apply this weighting scheme to the 2008 project set for 
the USDA’s Forest Legacy Program.  
 
3. Model  Development 




* =   ∑bixi (1) 
s.t.:             ∑pixi ≤ T  (2) 
                   xi{0,1} (3) 
 
where xi  is a binary variable indicating whether project i is chosen, bi  represents the 
environmental benefit score as determined by the Forest Legacy expert panel, and pi the funding 
request for project i. T is the total budget available for the selection program for the year. 
  Similarly a BLP program can be set-up to maximize the amount of in-kind cost share cost 
share, C*: 
 
Max:  C* =  ∑cixi (4) 
s.t.:             ∑pixi ≤ T  (5) 




A dual objective (two-dimensional) GP model can be developed as an extension of these 
two problems as the set-up to minimize a weighted sum of percent deviations from the maximum 
feasible value of in-kind cost share, C*, and environmental benefits, B
*.  Using these two 
extremes as targets, the GP problem can be set up and then the weighting between the two can be 
varied parametrically to examine the tradeoffs.  This problem is stated as follows:   
 
Min:  Z = λ(dC
-/C*) + (1-λ)(dB
-/B*) + ∑xi (7) 
s.t.:         ∑bixi – dB
+ +  dB
- = B*  (8) 
   ∑cixi – dC
+ +  dC
- = C*  (9) 
               ∑pixi ≤ T  (10) 
xi{0,1}; di
+, di
-, ≥ 0  (11) 
 
The deviation variables, dN
+/- are chosen to measure the achieved level of objective N (in 
this case either B
* or C
*), determined by ∑nixi, from N
*. In the objective function, the negative 
deviations are divided by the target value so that each represents a percentage deviation, and thus 
are of comparable magnitudes. The objective is to minimize the total deviations from the joint 
optima based on the priority weighting. The weighting factor, λ, can be varied parametrically 
from 0 to 1. This represents the percentage of priority that is given to in-kind costs, such that 
when λ is 0, 100% of the priority will be given to maximizing environmental benefits and when 
λ is 1, 100% of the priority will be given to maximizing in-kind cost share.  Thus when λ is 0.3, 
then 30% of the weight will be on in-kind cost share and 70% will be on environmental benefits.   
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As will be discussed below in the result section, the model can be expanded to consider 
more than two objectives.  Since managers of conservation programs typically are concerned 
about a range of objective which may have differing degrees of exclusivity, below we develop a 
three-dimensional model that incorporates total environmental benefits, in-kind cost share, and 
the total amount of acreage preserved.
iii 
Min:  Z = λC(dC
-/C*) + (λB)(dB
-/B*) + (λA)(dA
-/A*) + ∑xi (12) 
s.t.:         ∑cixi – dC
+ +  dC
- = C*  (13) 
               ∑bixi – dB
+ +  dB
- = B*  (14) 
∑aixi – dA
+ +  dA
- = A*  (15) 
               ∑pixi ≤ T  (16) 
   xi{0,1}; di
+, di
-, ≥ 0  (17) 
 
4.  Case Study: Forest Legacy Program 
The Forest Legacy Program (FLP) is a program administered by the US Forest Service to 
support the acquisition of conservation easements and other voluntary protection mechanisms on 
privately held forest land. It was established in 1990 and is the largest single protector of 
privately held forest land in the US. As of 2010, FLP has helped to protect nearly 2 million acres 
across 41 states and Puerto Rico.  The FLP works primarily with state agencies to acquire 
easements on privately held land to protect timber supply, wildlife habitat, soil and watershed 
protection, aesthetics, and recreational opportunities. Participating landowners typically receive 
some percentage of the land value and a decrease in their tax burden in exchange for the right to 
develop the land. In order to participate in the program landowners must develop a  
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comprehensive multiple resource management plan. The USDA requires states to provide at least 
25% of the total project costs, however no cap is placed on the percentage of in-kind cost sharing 
that can be offered by the applicants and some applicants to the FLP in the past have submitted 
in-kind cost shares of nearly 90%. The average percentage of in-kind cost share offered in 2008 
was 36.3%. Applicants receive no additional benefit from offering excess in-kind.  
FLP selects projects using an environmental benefit score determined by a panel of 
experts. Each panel member is asked to score each project from 0 to 30 based on importance, 
threat, and strategic value. Panel members are not allowed to evaluate projects from the states in 
which they work.  The three scores are summed such that each project is receives a score 
between 0 and 90 from each reviewer. The FLP administrators discard the lowest and highest 
scores and then average the remaining scores to assign the project a final score.  The projects are 
selected for funding using the BT algorithm.  
This research considers the 83 projects submitted to the FLP in 2008 from 44 states, 
Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables 
relevant to the model: the total project cost, the dollar amount of in-kind cost share offered, the 
percentage of total cost represented by the in-kind cost share offer, the average environmental 
benefit score, and the total amount of acres. The results of the BT and BLP selection mechanisms 
are displayed in Table 2. The increase offered by BLP represents a 120% increase in 
environmental benefits achieved over BT and 155% increase in the number of projects funded. 
This substantial improvement should be attractive to the program managers; however we also see 
a 53% decrease in in-kind cost share contributions and a 56% decrease in the number of acres 
protected. While these factors are external to the primary objective of the program this might still 
be a cause for concern, especially considering that there are no other options offered.  
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In order to explore what other options are available consider the results of the GP 
method, varying λ from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1. The results of this are displayed in Table 3 
and Figure 1. Starting from the BLP solution shown in the upper-left corner of Figure 1 (or λ = 0 
in the GP context), as the priority of in-kind cost sharing in the decision process is increased with 
increases in λ there are large improvements at relatively little cost in terms of environmental 
benefits. For example by moving from λ = 0.0 to λ = 0.2, the program could increase its in-kind 
cost share by 82% (from $46.5 million to $84.6 million) while only decreasing environmental 
benefits by less than 3% (from 3,024 to 2,937).  Interestingly, if the program manager also cared 
about the number of acres protected then a good result might be λ = 0.3.  In this case, there 
would be a 127% increase in in-kind cost share (from $46.5 million to $105.8 million) and a 
91% increase in total acres protected (from 100,975 acres to 193,120 acres), with only a 9% 
decrease in total environmental benefits (from 3,023 to 2,936).  
  Table 4 and Figure 2 show the results of the GP model which has been extended to 
include total number of acres protected as a third objective. The full set of solutions is quite 
large, so is not included. As might be expected the set shown in Figure 2 appears to represent a 
convex hull. This is not precisely the case as the full set of solutions is not continuous, but still 
represents a decreasing return relationship. It should also be noted that out of the 121 weighting 
schemes that were considered there were only 32 unique solutions. Solutions that appear multiple 
times in the set suggest robustness to preference weightings so might be attractive to program 
managers. Depending upon the preferences of the program administrators, this analysis reveals a 
number of attractive sets.  For instance, the solution yields zhigh aggregate environmental score 
of 2,561 (84.6 of the maximum possible) and in-kind cost share of $110,486,751 (90.0% of the  
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maximum possible), while delivering 81.1% of the highest possible number of acres (243,799) 
identified in these solutions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Optimization techniques have been frequently proposed to improve the performance of land 
conservation programs. There has been resistance to these by the conservation profession. One of 
the reasons for this may be that standard optimization techniques are one-dimensional. This 
paper outlines two- and three-dimensional models that uses Goal Programming (GP) to consider 
the tradeoffs between environmental benefits and in-kind cost sharing in conservation programs. 
By applying this approach to the Forest Legacy Program, this research shows with a two-
dimensional model that program managers can achieve substantially better results by considering 
such tradeoffs. For instance, by moving from a Binary Linear Program to a more flexible GP 
format, the US Forest Service’s Forest Legacy Program can achieve a 127% gain in in-kind cost 
share at only a 9% cost in benefits. Alternatively, by considering a three-dimensional ,model, a 
solution can be identified that achieves over 80% of the maximum levels of environmental 
benefits, in-kind cost share, and acres.  Thus by using GP, program managers can have more 
flexibility in knowledgably selecting projects based on their priorities.  
A potential limitation of including in-kind cost sharing in the decision process is that 
partner cost sharing can be implicitly integrated into the decision process in so far as it lowers 
the total amount that the funding agency is asked to pay. Assuming that the funding agency 
incorporates a notion of value into the decision mechanism through, for instance, cost-benefit 
ranking or budget constrained maximization, the use of in-kind cost sharing can be thought of as  
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incorporating an element of a “discount auction” where applicants’ bids are ranked in terms of 
the largest discount offered. An example of this type of scheme used by the Delaware 
Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, which select which parcels to protect based on the 
landowner’s discount offer, where the higher-discounted offers are selected ahead of lower-
discounted offers, without regard to the quality of the land parcel (Messer and Allen, 2010).  
Even though the inclusion of in-kind cost sharing to the objective function of a 
constrained optimization problem may appear redundant, program managers may find two 
attractive reasons of this approach. One is political; by achieving increased in-kind cost share 
contributions, a greater amount of total value can be achieved per dollar spent by the agency. A 
second reason is that by explicitly including in-kind cost-share in the decision mechanism 
applicants will have a clear incentive to offer a larger in-kind cost-share.  Whether applicants 
would actually raise their cost-share in response to increasing the likelihood of being selected is 
an area of potential research and might be a good place to apply experimental economics 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the 83 Forest Legacy Program Considered in 2008. 





Min  $60,000   $20,000  13% 49   5  
Max  $8,100,000   $33,000,000  88% 82   108,463  
Median  $2,200,000   $1,000,000  28% 70   1,060  
Mean   $2,311,389   $2,148,838  37% 69   4,635  





Table 2. Comparison of BLP and BT Selection Methods. 
 BT  BLP 
Funds Spent   $ 52,958,583  $ 52,898,650 
Environmental Benefit Score  1,396  3,024 
In-Kind Cost Share   $ 88,210,369  $ 46,515,001 
Acres Protected  221,647 100,975 
Projects Funded  18 45 
Avg. Parcel Environmental Benefit Score  77.60 67.20 
Avg. Parcel In-Kind Cost Share  42.62% 36.65% 
Avg. Parcel Acres Protected  12,313.72 2,243.89 

















1.0  1,534 $124,272,474 $177,268,827 70%  22 196,554 
0.9  1,919   $123,103,470 $176,071,810 70%  28 197,455 
0.8  2,169   $121,081,918 $173,985,818 70%  32 193,528 
0.7  2,301   $119,440,251 $172,414,151 69%  34 192,933 
0.6  2,604   $112,792,251 $165,751,151 68%  39 195,287 
0.5  2,689   $109,685,751 $162,564,651 67%  40 194,405 
0.4  2,753   $105,830,251 $158,829,151 67%  41 193,120 
0.3  2,753   $105,830,251 $158,829,151 67%  41 193,120 
0.2  2,937   $84,600,001 $137,473,651 62%  44 87,628 
0.1  2,997   $70,600,001 $123,573,651 57%  45 88,743 









% of Max. 
Env. Benefits 
(B
*)   In-Kind Cost Share 
% of Max. 
In-Kind Cost 
Share (C
*)   Acres  





                 1,436  47.5%   $        80,565,891  64.8%       300,781  100.0%  2
                 1,534  50.7%   $      105,359,422  84.8%       288,544  95.9%  2
                 1,565  51.8%   $        97,901,426  78.8%       295,312  98.2%  4
                 1,607  53.1%   $      105,337,422  84.8%       288,494  95.9%  4
                 1,664  55.0%   $        97,906,922  78.8%       295,204  98.1%  5
                 1,682  55.6%   $        87,307,647  70.3%       299,987  99.7%  5
                 1,697  56.1%   $        85,232,647  68.6%       300,291  99.8%  3
                 1,745  57.7%   $        88,944,397  71.6%       299,242  99.5%  6
                 1,805  59.7%   $        90,971,922  73.2%       297,737  99.0%  6
                 1,907  63.1%   $      105,303,115  84.7%       283,686  94.3%  4
                 2,030  67.1%   $        97,952,115  78.8%       289,540  96.3%  2
                 2,070  68.5%   $        89,378,816  71.9%       295,985  98.4%  12
                 2,091  69.1%   $        87,777,066 70.6%       295,765  98.3%  1
                 2,143  70.9%   $        90,116,316  72.5%       293,990  97.7%  2
                 2,144  70.9%   $        89,268,264  71.8%       294,399  97.9%  4
                 2,157  71.3%   $        55,851,541  44.9%       295,125  98.1%  1
                 2,205  72.9%   $        98,526,563  79.3%       284,553  94.6%  5
                 2,210  73.1%   $        53,387,739  43.0%       294,190  97.8%  1
                 2,226  73.6%   $      106,255,588  85.5%       273,049  90.8%  2
                 2,263  74.8%   $      108,385,588  87.2%       267,952  89.1%  3
                 2,266  74.9%   $        89,904,063  72.3%       290,877  96.7%  11
                 2,315  76.5%   $        87,848,264  70.7%       289,612  96.3%  1
                 2,325  76.9%   $        88,423,264  71.2%       289,056  96.1%  4
                 2,342  77.5%   $        99,000,588  79.7%       277,841  92.4%  1
                 2,367  78.3%   $        90,319,063  72.7%       285,704  95.0%  1
                 2,395  79.2%   $        58,863,264  47.4%       290,392  96.5%  9
                 2,395  79.2%   $      110,390,588  88.8%       257,145  85.5%  2
                 2,445  80.9%   $        99,048,921  79.7%       272,430  90.6%  4
                 2,455  81.2%   $      110,458,418  88.9%       252,587  84.0%  1
                 2,469  81.7%   $      108,564,251  87.4%       255,303  84.9%  1
                 2,506  82.9%   $        99,116,751  79.8%       267,872  89.1%  2
                 2,513  83.1%   $        90,251,421  72.6%       278,392  92.6%  8
                 2,561  84.7%   $      110,486,751  88.9%       243,799  81.1%  2
 Maximum    Maximum  Maximum  Maximum 
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  2,561   $      110,486,751          300,781                   12 
  
 






Figure 2. Result Set from Three Objective Goal Programming Problem. 
 
                                                            
i U.S. calculations based on data from Claassen R., Conservation Policy Briefing Room, Economic Research Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. <http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/conservationpolicy/background.htm> accessed 
Feb. 2010. 
ii E.U. calculations based on data for Axis 2, Section 214, of the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy 
from:  European Union Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, “Rural Development in the 
European Union: Statistical and Economic Information Report 2009.” (EU, Brussels, 2009).  
iii Note that as the number of objectives increases constructing a systematic weighting scheme 
becomes rather complex and the solutions set is less amenable to visual representation. None the 
less, the technique can still be useful to explore alternate solutions and the effects of changing 
prioritization schemes.  
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